We should take China's space ambitions more seriously
It's competitive, strategic, and part of a bigger plan
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There is a deficit in understanding the Chinese space program under the current media landscape, and it’s a part of an even more severe deficit in understanding China.
The Chinese perform a lot of actions in space with little coverage. Partly, this is due to the secretive approach the Chinese take to run their space programs, but partly, it’s also due to the lack of interest from core space fans in the west.
I know this too well because I’m a part of the problem. YouTube algorithm in 2021 is vertical driven and retention driven, they want people to stay on the platform rather than pushing important information, I’ve made a few attempts on analyzing the Chinese space programs or projects, they never perform, whereas my coverages on SpaceX’s rocket development as well as Blue Origin and Rocket lab do really well.
I’ve predicted SpaceX’s dominance when most people were still discussing its lack of track record, and I have called out the Space Launch Systems’ silly economics in 2017, which was delayed yet again this August.
But you know what’s not delayed? The Chinese Space programs and their rocket launches. If SpaceX and the space community are serious about building an extraterrestrial presence, we cannot ignore the China factor. SpaceX is the biggest single factor when it comes to space, but it is not the total equation, there are still the Russians, the private Satcom sector which will be SpaceX’s primary clients, and very importantly, SpaceX’s most formidable competitor, the Chinese.
So in this post, let’s explore the Chinese space programs and their launch vehicles, How do the Chinese run their space programs? what’s their level of capability? and importantly, what does China want and why when it comes to space.
The secretive Chinese Space programs
Let’s start by explaining the actors and agencies in the Chinese space landscape. A major difference between China and the US is that most rocket manufacturers I mention from China today would be state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rather than privately owned corporations like in the US, which means their agency is subordinate to the wills of the CPC’s leadership, and their allocation of funding. (When I explain like this, it seems to be the same in the U.S.)
Under the Chinese system, the defense industry is funded by the state and is under the direct influence of state actors. CNSA, China’s equivalent of NASA, is directly supervised by China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which is led by the state council of China. The head of the state council in China’s Premier Li Keqiang. So, the head of CNSA is directly appointed by the State Council and CPC, which means his boss is Premier Li and President Xi. In the U.S. NASA’s director is appointed by the president of the United States, and NASA’s funding is appropriated by the U.S. Congress. So, it’s similar.
Furthermore, the manufacturer of the Chinese Long March rockets is a state-owned enterprise called China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which is owned by the state as the name suggests. CASC’s president and directors are appointed by the CPC and the State Council as well, but they are usually engineers and managers with a track record of working in the same field throughout their lives. For instance, WU Yansheng, the current president and chairman of CASC graduated from Tsinghua University with a bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and he joined CASC in his early 20s. He rose to become a lead engineer, manager, director, and finally in 2014, he was appointed to be the president of CASC. His career in CASC took 25 years. My point is, many MSM will tell you that China’s SOEs are inefficient, which is true, but still, we need to understand that at an individual level, the company is led by competent engineers and managers. On a group level, SOEs had been inefficient and bureaucratic, but since the 1990s, SOE reforms have encouraged less state influence to ensure efficiency. So, in terms of business structure, it is operated as a private business.
Now, the Chinese launch vehicles.
Chinese launch vehicles are called the long march, named after the military retreat undertaken by the Red Army. In history, the long march was a consequential and nirvana moment for the Communist Party of China. The CCP, under the eventual command of Mao Zedong, escaped in a circling retreat to the west and north, which reportedly traversed over 9,000 kilometers (5,600 mi) over 370 days. Over half of the red army died along the way either fighting with the Nationalist army or due to the terrible conditions.
So, the name long march suggests the long and strenuous journey ahead to develop the Chinese space programs, and also the optimism for ieventual success.
They indeed are successful. Over the years, many long march vehicles were built. Here is a rundown of their specs.
In terms of their capability, for small launch (Falcon 1): CZ - 6 and CZ -11
CZ - 6 has 3 stages, is 29 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 500 kg
CZ -11 has 4 solid stages, is 20 meters tall and a LEO payload capacity of 300 kg
For heavy launch (equivalent to Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy): CZ - 2F, CZ - 3 series, CZ - 4 series, CZ - 5 series, CZ - 7 series, and CZ - 8 series
CZ - 2F is 58 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 8,800 kg
CZ - 3A is 53 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 6,000 kg
CZ - 3B/E is 56 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 11,500 kg
CZ - 3C is 56 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 9,100 kg
CZ - 4B is 48 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 4,200 kg
CZ - 4C is 48 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 4,200 kg
CZ - 5 is 57 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 25,000 kg
CZ - 5B is 54 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 25,000 kg
CZ - 7 is 53 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 14,000 kg
CZ - 7A’s specs are similar to CZ - 7
CZ - 8 is 50 meters tall with a LEO payload capacity of 7,600 kg
For super-heavy launch (Starship): CZ - 9 (in-development). It is planned to be fully reusable with a LEO payload capacity of 140,000 kg.
Here is how they look like in comparison, as you can see, the two vehicles that do most ‘heavy-lifting’ for China’s space missions are the CZ - 3 series and CZ - 5 series, both of which come with side boosters.
Here’s China’s launch vehicle development in chronological order, from CZ -1 to CZ - 11, the development took over 50 years while China’s space capability slowly built up. The naming conversion denotes the sequence of which the project was initiated, not when it was finished. That’s why you see that the Super Heavy lift CZ-9’s development will finish at around the mid to late 2020s, while CZ-11 is already operational.
CZ - 9, the planned Super Heavy equivalent from China is the next-generation 100-ton capability vehicle China is building, and reportedly, the Chinese are also going to make CZ - 9 reusable so that it is competitive to Starship. China is working on this vertical landing capability with CZ - 8 right now, since the Chinese already possess the technology to land rovers on the Moon, it is a matter of time before China becomes the second country to land rockets like the U.S.’ SpaceX. (My assessment）
CNSA’s key objectives
According to CNSA’s website, it has 8 categories of offerings as shown in the image below. From top left to bottom right, they are 1)launchers, 2)satellite products, 3)landers, and rovers, 4)spacecraft, 5)deep space exploration, 6)High-resolution Earth Observation System, 7)manned space flight, 8)Beidou Satellite Navigation Systems, the icons are quite self-explanatory.
According to CNSA’s White Paper: China's Space Activities in 2016 (Chinese + English version), CNSA’s key objective is,
To explore outer space and enhance understanding of the earth and the cosmos; to utilize outer space for peaceful purposes, promote human civilization and social progress, and benefit the whole of mankind; to meet the demands of economic, scientific and technological development, national securityand social progress, and to improve the scientific and cultural levels of the Chinese people, protect China's national rights and interests, and build up its overall strength.
And CNSA’s vision is,
To build China into a space power in all respects, with the capabilities to make innovations independently, to make scientific discovery and research at the cutting edge, to promote strong and sustained economic and social development, to effectively and reliably guarantee national security, to exercise sound and efficient governance, and to carry out mutually beneficial international exchanges and cooperation; to have an advanced and open space science and technology industry, stable and reliable space infrastructure, pioneering and innovative professionals, and a rich and profound space spirit; to provide strong support for the realization of the Chinese Dream of the renewal of the Chinese nation, and make positive contributions to human civilization and progress.
I highlighted the keywords above. There are essentially 3 key objectives for CNSA,
it is about building “a community with a shared future for mankind”,
it is about upholding China’s national security and developmental right,
in addition to “enhancing the understanding of the Earth and the cosmos”.
At first glance, non of those missions have any malign intentions, and they don’t, but when you look at these goals, all of them take roots from a bigger meta-idea called Geoeconomics. Though politicians like to make it political or even call these competitions “national security”, it is in fact about economic interests at a national level. When one country's principal economic sector directly competes with that of another country, governments become the chief protagonists in the competition, not companies.
Geoeconomics becomes clearer when we look at CNSA’s actual implementation of these objectives.
CNSA’s Roadmap ahead
This section’s primary source is the latest information on CNSA’s 2025 plan in a conference held in June this year as well as CNSA’s key mission overview from its website.
Currently, non of the rumored Chinese mission to Mars is in a solid plan yet because the Chinese space program has a strong emphasis on accountability, partly due to the top-down management style of the Chinese government. To put things into a plan with timelines is to give your manager a criterion to assess your performance. So, when you do promise your manager something such as Mars by 2030, you better make it happen or no promotion for you.
CNSA emphasizes four key missions, manned spaceflight, exploration of the Moon and deep space, China High-resolution Earth Observation System, and the Beidou GNSS. I will start with CNSA’s plan for its space stations first.
Manned Spaceflight
China’s manned spaceflight progressed steadily over the years. China’s first manned spaceflight was successfully carried out in 2003, and Yang Liwei, a Chinese taikonaut orbited the Earth 14 times before he successfully landed in Inner Mongolia, China.
Experimental space stations Tiangong-1 and Tiangong-2 were built 5 years apart in 2011 and 2016 respectively as key technology demonstrations, and three taikonauts inhibited the stations, demonstrated the core capability of autonomous orbital docking, multiple crews missions, spacewalk and etc.
In 2021, China’s latest and final space station was launched in April called Tiangong Space Station, which will be assembled over a 2 year period. It has a capacity of holding 3 - 6 people in space at once.
Exploration of the Moon and Deep Space (CLEP)
The second key mission is an extension to the first, from lower earth orbit to the Moon and beyond. This requires a leap in technology when it comes to China’s launch vehicles, so far CZ -3 and CZ - 5 with their capability of over 10 tons to LEO is able to carry out missions to the moon, the super-heavy class CZ - 9 in development will be the next generation vehicle doing the heavy lifting for manned mars missions and beyond.
China Lunar Exploration program started in 2007 and followed a 3 phase“orbit, land, and return” strategy. The Chinese followed their timeline meticulously and successfully returned lunar samples from the Moon in 2020, which was right on schedule according to their plan (link in Chinese) back in 2004!
Orbit: Chang’e 1 and 2 reached the moon in 2007 and 2010 respectively. These are technology demonstrations to test key capabilities.
Land: Chang’e 3 launched and landed on the moon in 12 days and carried with it the first Yutu (Jade Rabbit) rover which conducted ultra-violet observations of galaxies, active galactic nuclei, variable stars, binaries, novae, quasars, and blazars, as well as the structure and dynamics of the Earth's plasmasphere. Chang’e 4 became the first lander to soft-land on the far side of the Moon near its the South Pole. This is designed so as to understand that area and prepare for a potential base near the South Pole of the Moon. The location is chosen because the South Pole of the Moon may have Sunlight for 3 months straight and may have water.
Return: Chang’e 5 returned 2kg of sample from the Moon in 2020.
All of this can be seen as a technology demonstration for manned missions in 2030 (as early as 2025).
Beidou GNSS is China’s answer to the U.S. GPS with both civilian and military applications. The keyword is precision, with Beidou, it could help precision irrigation, precision manufacturing, but it can also guide PLA missiles to their targets with a precision of less than half a meter.
China's High-resolution Earth Observation System (CHEOS) is China’s reconnaissance capability again, with the aim of helping farming, manufacturing, environmental protection, and preventing disasters. This system has become particularly useful during the flood in Zhengzhou, China. These satellites monitoring flood situations with precision helped warn local citizens before the flood came.
But of course, what worries the U.S. government isn’t how great the Chinese reconnaissance satellites are at saving citizens’ lives during disasters, U.S. strategists look at its military applications as seen in the above.
My take is, the anxiety is understandable, but there is no going back, US strategists have to contend with a powerful space rival in China now. And China must navigate a more confrontational America as well.
What are CNSA’s goalposts now?
Technology Demonstration: To finish the Chinese space station; to build a reusable vehicle; to build a Super heavy-lift launch vehicle.
Launch Vehicle: To build a super-heavy (>100kg LEO) class vehicle by the mid-2020s, which is the key enabler of its Mars missions and manned Moon missions. This is the foundation of space.
Space Exploration: Boots on the Moon by 2030; Mars sample retrieval by 2030.
Infrastructure: To support China’s private sector & the military through building satellite systems, high-resolution observation systems, and technology transfer.
Conclusion
Now that we know CNSA’s key activities, if we go back to the 3 objectives summarized above, to me, they represent CNSA’s desire to extend
Economic power
Military power
Soft power
China, through its space initiatives, is competing at a national level to build a better space infrastructure, on behalf of its private sector.
Think about Amazon, can it take off in the 1990s if the U.S. government had not built the extensive highway system decades prior? Can Tiktok succeed if 4G infrastructure is not built in the developed world?
This is the symbiotic public and private sector relationship I talked about. Ronald Regan famously said,
The government is not the solution, government is the problem.
Well, he is wrong. Public sector investment is important to private sector growth, there are sectors of our economy that are essential but are not profitable for private companies. In these cases, the government must go in and invest or even compete so as to help domestic private companies to flourish.
The public sector is the base upon which the private sector is built. This base is not only measured by the amount of infrastructure spending, it is also about the size of the market, its talent pool, level of technology, and the inter-nations competitions. As far as I can tell, there are no free-market ideals when countries compete. It’s brutal and all-encompassing. Very often, it will start with economic competition, but if economic means do not work, this may shift to financial means, media means, and the ultimate competition, of course, would be a military war. So it is important for all of us to make sure the competition is confined to the economic arena. I digressed, but you get what I mean.
Can Huawei fight the U.S. government? No, but China can. If Huawei is a Brazilian company, it would have died the moment U.S. sanctions were implemented. Huawei is still surviving (barely for its smartphone business) because it is a Chinese champion and it has the Chinese market backed by the Chinese industries.
Likewise, can Facebook start in France? Maybe, but I suspect the discussion in the U.S. Congress with regard to Facebook’s control over Americans’ lives would be very different if it’s a French company.
This is partly why there are no energy giants from South East Asia, and there is no social media champion in Europe because the EU parliament bought into the free market ideal and did not support local alternatives. Now they regretted it and started waging anti-monopoly cases against Facebook and Google, but it’s too late1.
The space competition happening right now between China and the U.S. is emblematic of the wider narrative of competition that we got ourselves into in the past 4 years. While competition is often better for innovation, it is also important to have our sights on the most important challenges of this century, that is the environment and the agility to manage tech and social disruptions, partly why I started this newsletter to work on.
Those disruptions are too important to miss, and we’ll cover more aspects of them on Disrupted.
good stuff
Love this article. keep it up!